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STABILITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN CANON LAW
AND THE CASE OF "DEFINITIVE" TEACHING
Ladislas Orsy, S.j.*
The beginning of knowledge is wonder, wonder provoked by a
puzzle whose pieces do not seem to fit together. We do have such an
on-going puzzle in canon law; it is the prima facie conflict between the
demand of stability and the imperative of development.
Stability is an essential quality of any good legal system because a
community's laws are an expression of its identity, and there is no
identity without permanency. Many times we hear in the United
States that we are a country held together by our laws. Although the
statement cannot be the full truth, it is obvious that if our laws ever
lost their stability, the nation's identity would be imperiled. In a religious community where the source of its identity is in the common
memory of a divine revelation, the demand for stability is even
stronger. Fidelity to the "Word of God" becomes the principal virtue.
Yet, any good legal system must be open and receptive to developments. No community, secular or religious, can be frozen in time and
live; absolute stillness means death. In a political community, the internal energies of the citizenry and the pressing forces of history have
their unrelenting impact on the laws and demand changes. Similar
forces operate in a religious community: the "gathering" of the believers, eccesia, is never a static monument; it is a living body animated by
internal resources and responding to external influences. The eschatological destiny of the members (their expectation of eternal life)
does not protect them from the vicissitudes of history.
Thus, the demand for stability and the imperative of development are vital forces in any living community; they operate in nations
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and churches. The question, therefore, is not how the one could be
eliminated and the other kept. Nor could it be which of the two
should prevail. Both are needed. Our inquiry can be only about their
respective roles and a desirable balance between the two that protects
the group's identity and leaves enough space for the imperative of
growth and expansion.
I wish to pursue this inquiry on two levels, the abstract and the

concrete. On the abstract level, I will be searching for principles: how
to build a good balance between stability and development and how
to recognize an authentic development-a modest inquiry. I do not
expect to discover the "best rules" that could serve as magic measures
in all cases. Rather, I wish to search for some orientation and a working method that can prove helpful in handling real-life situations. On
the concrete level, I shall examine a recent case of legislation about
"definitive teaching" and make an attempt to assess its impact on the
freedom of research.
I.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

Concepts are the building blocks for principles. My first task,
therefore, will be to account for my use of some foundational terms in
this inquiry: canon law, stability, and development.
A.

FoundationalConcepts

Canon law in this Essay means norms created by the ecclesiastical
legislator, hence of human origin. Admittedly, the official Code of Canon Law also includes norms of divine origin: baptism is necessary for
becoming a Christian, the Church has the power to forgive sins, the
evangelical message must be proclaimed to all nations, and so forth.I
Such divine ordinances, however, are not the subject matter of my
inquiry.
I focus on the so-called "ecclesiastical laws"-a conventional expression to designate human laws in the Church. What are they? Let
us begin our inquiry with Aquinas's definition of human law: an ordinance of reason-by the one in charge of the community-fur the sake of the
common good-promulgated.2 These spare words cover a wealth of ideas.

Positively, they state that the purpose of the law is the common good, the
maker of the law is someone who holds his power in trust and has been
1 CODE OF CANON Lawv (1999) (reprinting the Latin text of the original 1983
CODEX IURIS CANONICI with some later official corrections and additions); see also
P. BIEL ET AL., NEW COMMENTARY ON THE CODE OF CANON LAW (2000).
See THoMAS AQUINAS, SuMMA THEOLOGIAE pt. I-II, qq. 90-97. See in particular,
id. pt. I-II, q. 95.
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mandated to take care of the community, the content of the law is a

command measured by reason, and the bilh of the law is in a public act
through which due information is given to the community 3 It follows, negatively, that a norm which is not for the good of the social

body is not law, a command that is in contravention of the sacred duty
of taking care of the people has no binding force, an ordinance that
reason cannot approve of is invalid, and a duty ill-defined is as good as
non-existent. In sum, from the realm of the law, Aquinas excludes

self-serving politics, tyranny, irrationality, and prosecutions that can
catch a person unaware. He knows what the rule of law is about, and
he knows it in the thirteenth century!
We have now a "generic" definition of human law. Canon law is
one of its "species": it is human law in the Church. Aquinas's text
needs to be completed with due regard for the religious nature of the

community.

4

Canon law, therefore, is an ordinance conceived and articulatedly
reason and faith-enactedby an authority sacramentallyestablished-for the

sake of creatingafavorable environment in the community for the reception of
God's gifts-promulgated.
Positively, the purpose of the canon law is the creation of a favorable
environment for the people to receive God's gifts, or the creation of a
favorable environment for God to distribute his gifts (we should not
forget that human beings have the capacity to put obstacles even to

God's gracious actions);5 the nakers of the law are persons sacramen3 Aquinas does not include the act of "reception" in the full definition of law. It
could be argued that the act of promulgation by the legislator is the first movement in
an operation that is essentially communication, but no communication can exist vithout reception. Reception itself can be purely nominal or substantial. 'Through a
nominal reception the community takes notice of the promulgation of the law but
otherwise ignores it. Substantial reception exists when the subjects embrace the law
for the sake of the values supported by the law. Only through such substantial acceptance can the law become a vital force in the community and be instrumental in shaping the life and operations of the group. If the subjects do not embrace the %-lues
that the law intends to support, the words of the law remain precisely that, words, or
flatus vocis (best translated as "empty sound" or "noisy wind").
4 According to Aquinas, the various "species" of law are eternal law in the mind
of God, divine law revealed to human persons, natural law discovered by reason, and
human law conceived and enacted by human persons in charge of community. See
AQUINAS, supranote 2, at pt. I-I, q. 91. For a detailed commentary on Aquinas's texts
on law, see THOMtAS AQUrNAs, THE TarxrsSE ON LIw (R.J. Henle ed., 1993).
5 This definition is inspired by the purpose of canon law, which is, as I say above,
"the creation of a favorable environment for the people to receive God's gifts, or the
creation of a favorable environment for God to distribute his gifts .... " Admittedly, it
is not the usual way of defining canon law. The authors of the manuals prefer to take
their clue from the "essence" of civil law. the laws purpose is to create order. So
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tally entrusted and empowered to guide and serve the community; the
content of the law is measured by human rationality and intelligence of
faith; and the binding force of the law is created through the act of
promulgation.
Negatively, this definition excludes from the life of the Church
any ordinance that harms the personal dignity of a believer and blocks
the development of his or her intelligence and freedom; it denies the
legislator any power that is not of evangelical service; it bars any rule
that contradicts reason or faith; and it rejects any criminal procedure
based on obscure or ambivalent concepts. In sum, in canon law there
is no place for any formalism, any lording it over the community, anything irrational or irreligious, or any prosecution without fair warning
about the crime.
The other concepts are stability and development. The two differ
essentially as standing differs from running. Existentially, however,
they are not autonomous qualities in splendid isolation or in continuous conflict but dynamic forces working together for the good of the
whole. They contribute jointly to the well-being of the whole body:
the one gives it permanency in identity, the other brings it growth and
expansion. Their interaction keeps the body in good balance. A conceptual understanding of the two forces may be necessary, but not
enough. To grasp what they are, we must watch them in their dynamic interaction.
Stability in the world of the laws creates a sense of security in the
subjects. Legal developments offer them opportunity to use their potentials increasingly.
Catholic believers see the Church as well-grounded in stability:
Christ is its founder, his Spirit is its life-giver. No one can take away
the memory of the evangelical message and no one can strangle the
forces of divine energy. The same believers, however, often perceive
development as problematic: "How can we know," they ask, "true progress from deceptive change? How can we differentiate healthy
growth from sickly decline?"
much is, of course, true; the Church needs order. But the Church needs a specific
order in which God and his people are free to exchange gifts ....

Such an under-

standing of "ecclesiastical law" takes its clue from theology. To have the correct understanding of canon law is of no small matter: differing perceptions are bound to
have differing consequences. Here is an example: a twisted mind could justify the
inquisition by invoking the need for order, but no sane Christian could ever claim
that the inquisition created a climate for the reception of God's gifts or created a1
peaceful environment for God to distribute his gifts. Definitions matter: abstract principles have concrete consequences.
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A seasoned answer is available: it comes from Cardinal John
Henry Newman. In his Essay on the Development of ChristianDoctrine,
published in its final form in 1878, he proposed a theory that is as
valid today as it was in his days.6 His interest xwas primarily in explaining the development of doctrine in the Christian church, but most of
what he said is applicable to the development of canon law.
He proposed seven positive criteria for recognizing genuine developments and as many negative marks for identifying destructive
changes. For brevity's sake, I pull them together and summarize them
under three headings.
The positive signs are the following- First, a healthy development
respects the foundations of the institution-its identity remains intact,
and the leading principles of its existence and operations are not destroyed. Second, true development shows a harmonious progress
from the old to the new-it is the fruit of historical continuity, the
roots of the new are in the old, and the once hidden potentials of the
old are revealed in the new. Third, the new has a vigor of life-it is
filled with energy, and it brings life to its surroundings.
These signs speak even more clearly if we contrast them with
their opposites, the signs of decline: First, a false development destabilizes the foundations of an institution-it has a corrosive impact on
the community's identity, and it undermines the original principles of
its activities. Second, in the transition from the old to the new there is
a radical break-the new does not grow out of the old, and the image
of the old cannot be found in the new. Third, the new shows no vigor
of life, it exhibits decay-it weakens the institution, and it leads to
stagnation, alienation, and loss of quality of life.
Now we have some workable criteria by which to judge what is, or
what is not, an authentic development in the realm of doctrine and in
the realm of law. Before we go any further, however, we need to understand the basic difference between the "Church teaching" and the
"Church acting." While the Church is protected in its judgments
about the articles of faith, in matters of practical prudence it can fall
short of the highest standard.
B. Prudence in the Church
The Catholic belief is that in matters of doctrine the universal
Church is endowed with the charism of fidelity to God's revelation,
6 The book had many editions and reprints; for an edition 'ith extensive critical
.oPM Er.t' OF CHusn-u'
apparatus, see JOHN HENRY NEw1miAN, AN Ess.y ON THE D
DocrmINa (Charles Harold ed., Longmans, Green & Co. 1949) (1878). In particular,
see chapter 5, GenuineDevelopments Contrastedwith Comptions, id. at 155-91.
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commonly explained as infallibility. 7 This charism is granted to the
whole Church, but the final judge of the authenticity of the revealed
message is the college of bishops presided over by the Pope, or the
Pope acting (defining) alone using his own full apostolic authority.
It is not, however, and it has never been, the Catholic belief that
in practical and temporal matters the Church at large, or its office
holders, w~re given the charism of the highest degree of prudence.
The history of the Church proves overwhelmingly that this is indeed
the truth. Vatican Council II spoke on the matter: "In its pilgrimage
on earth Christ summons the Church to continual reformation, of
which it is always in need, in so far as it is an institution of human
beings on earth."8
When Pope John Paul II offers his apologies for the past "mistakes" of those who acted "in the name of the Church," he therefore
obeys the Council and confirms the timeless fragility of the Church in
matters of prudence. 9
This innate fragility affects the official operations of the Church.
It affects all who are making, administering, and explaining ecclesiastical laws. This is not to suggest that the laws should not be obeyed,
but it is to state that canon law must never be approached with the
same reverence that is due to ecclesiastical teaching. The one is about
truth eternal, the other is about matters temporal-some of them sacred but still temporal. Human laws in the Church can be supremely
prudent-and they can fail to be prudent. Mostly, though, they do
not represent the extremes. Instead, they honor God and display our
human limitations. This is not to suggest that the officials of the
Church can be so imprudent as to lose sight completely of the end of
all laws, which is "the salvation of souls,"' 0 and then mislead the
Church away from the path of the Kingdom. It is to say that, in choosing the temporal means toward the organization of the community
and its activities, the persons in charge may fail to reach well-balanced,
prudential judgments, as it happened, for example, in the cases of the
7 See VATICAN COUNCIL II, DOGMATIC CONSTITUTION ON THE CHuRcH Lumen gentium Nos. 12, 22-23 (Clarence Gallagher trans. (1990)) [hereinafter Lumen gentium]
(decreeing the infallibility of the people of God in Number 12 and the power of the
episcopal college and its head, the bishop of Rome, in Numbers 22-23), reprinted in II
DECREES OF THE ECUMENICAL COUNCILS 858, 865-68 (Norman Tanner ed., 1990).
8 VATICAN COUNCIL II, DECREE ON ECUMENISM Unitatis redintegratioNo. 6 (Edward
Yamold trans., 1990).
9 SeeJohn Paul II, Jubilee Characteristic:The Purificationof lemoy, 29 ORiGINs 648,
649-50 (2000).
10 1983 CODE c.1752.
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Crusades, the Inquisition, the close alliance with the secular power,
and so forth.
This is the context in which any new legislation needs to be
assessed.
H.

THE CASE OF DEFlNrrn

TEACHING

By way of introducing the case of "definitive teaching," let me
state firmly that in matters of doctrine stability is essential. The faithful must not lose the memory of the evangelical message; it is the
source of their identity. Yet, as a seed is there to be sown, strike roots,
and grow into a plant, so the message sown in the mind and heart of
the people must strike roots, grow, and produce fruit that is the intelligence of faith. Such development is equally essential. Vatican Council II expressed this balance well:
The universal body of the faithful who have received the anointing
of the holy one ...cannot be mistaken in belief.... It adheres
indefectibly to "the faith which was once for all delivered to the
saints" (Jude 3); it penetrates more deeply into that same faith
through right judgment and applies it more fully to life."
"It adheres indefectibly": there is the demand of stability. "It penetrates more deeply": there is the imperative of development.
An oft-quoted traditional rule expresses well the ideal balance between stability and development in matters of belief: "in necessary
things unity, in doubtful things liberty, in all things charity." The
"necessary things" are what we need to believe because they belong to
the very core of the Christian Tradition; we must be one in professing
them.' 2 In modem, mainly post Vatican I, times, such doctrines are
often described as "articles of faith infallibly taught." They are articulated in our creeds, in the "determinations" of the ecumenical councils, and in the papal "definitions." They are also proclaimed and
honored in the daily worship of the universal Church.
The "doubtful things" are not teachings that Christians ought to
doubt or contest but points of doctrine that-as yet-have not been
fully authenticated in any of the legitimate ways as integral parts of the
Tradition.' 3 They are positions and opinions (usually inherited) that
11 Lumen gentiur, supranote 7, at No. 12.
12 In Christian theology it is customary to distinguish between Tradition (with a
capital T) and traditions. The former refers to the one and undivided core of the
evangelical message that must be kept intact. The latter refers to historical accretions
that may be venerable but not indispensable.

13 Such legitimate ways include, for example, the whole Church so believing, ecumenical councils so teaching, popes so defining.
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ought to be respected but are in need of scrutiny to discover their
significance for the community. For such an inquiry liberty is
essential.
Charity, of course, needs no explanation.
A.

The Code of Canon Law, 1983

The Code of Canon Law, promulgated in 1983, mandated a healthy
balance between stability and development. Its Canon 750 (as it was
4
then) stressed the importance of stability."
All that is contained in the word of God, handed over in writing or
by tradition; that is, [all] that is in the one deposit of faith entrusted
to the church, and is proclaimed either by the solemn magisterium
of the church, or by its ordinary and universal magisterium, which is
made manifest by the common assent of the faithful under the guidance of the sacred magisterium; must be believed with divine and
Catholic faith; all are bound, therefore, to reject doctrines contrary
to it.15
Canon 218 asserted the imperative of development and the need
for 'Just freedom" in research.
Persons dedicated to sacred disciplines enjoy just freedom in research and in manifesting their opinion prudently in matters in
which they are experts while paying due respect to the magisterium
16
of the church.
The two canons together stated well the right and duty of the
community-to preserve and to let evolve the evangelical doctrine. In
case of conflict between the two tasks, an additional norm tipped the
scale in the favor of development, as Canon 749, paragraph 3, prescribed: "No doctrine is understood to be infallible unless it is manifestly so proven."' 7 In other terms, the researcher must be free to
investigate and report on his findings unless it is manifest that he
14 The Code of CanonLaw in its original Latin makes extensive use of complex and
lengthy sentences with cascading subordinated clauses difficult to translate into English. To guide the reader through such texts, I break up the canons into brief and
intelligible clauses. Mostly, I use the official translation by the Canon Law Society of
America approved for the United States, CODE OF CANON LAW, supra note 1, except
when greater fidelity to the original text demands some modification. Ironically, the
style of the Code of Canon Law is often closer to the complicated compositions of
Cicero than to the limpid simplicity of the classical lawyers of ancient Rome,

15 1983

CODE

16 M c.218.
17 Id. c.749.

c.750.
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would undermine infallible teaching. In legal language, there is a
presumption in favor of the "faith seeking understanding."'8
B.

The Apostolic Letter, 1998

This balance established by the Code of Canon Law, however, was
changed in 1998 with the promulgation of the Apostolic Letter motu
proprio Ad tuendamfidem.19 The Letter introduced into, and imposed
on, the Church a new category of teaching, called "definitive," and
explained it as not infallible but irreformable. Effectively, if not verbally, it transferred some freely debated doctrines from the field of
the "doubtful things" to the field of the "necessary things," where no
20
question must be raised any more about their unchangeable nature.
To this effect, the motu proprio added a second paragraph to Canon
750 (the original text has become paragraph one). The added text

reads:
Each and every proposition stated definitively by the magisterium of
the church concerning the doctrine of the faith or morals, that is,
each and every proposition required for the sacred preservation

and faithful explanation of the same deposit of faith, must also be
firmly embraced and maintained; anyone, therefore, who rejects
18 The Church can afford such a generosity. After all, the Spirit is protecting its
collective memory.
19 Pope John Paul II, Ad tuendamfiden, 28 ORuctNs 113 (1998). For a brief commentary, see Ladislas Orsy, Von der Autoritat hirdiiderDoaumente, 216 STmrEN DER
ZErr 735 (1998). The commentary was followed by Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, Stdlungnahme, 217 SrmIEN DER ZEIT 169 (1999), to which Ladislas Orsy responded with
Antwort an KardinalRatzinger, 217 STIMmEN DER ZErr 305 (1999).
20 A "Commentary" signed by the Prefect and the Secretary of the Congregation
for the Doctrine of Faith but not approved by the Congregation as a corporate body
(hence having no official standing) gives some examples of "definitive" teachings.
For example, it lists the reseration of priestly ordination only to men, the illicitness
of euthanasia, the illicitness of prostitution, the legitimacy of the election of the Pope,
the validity of an ecumenical council, the canonization of saints, and the invalidity of
Anglican orders. CardinalJoseph Ratzinger & Archbishop Tarcisio Bertone, Commentary on Profession of Faith'sConludingParagrap1s 28 OJGINS 116, 118-19 (1998). The
list demonstrates an intent to bring (not conceptually but practically) under papal
infallibility a good numbe of sundry doctrines that many theologians considered disputed questions. It is difficult to determine what the common criterion was for the
selection for the doctrines listed.
Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger suggested repeatedly that the "definitive doctrines"
have the same standing and authority as the "secondary objects of infallibility" discussed, accepted, but not precisely defined at Vatican Council I. &e Ratzinger, supra

note 16. His suggestion, to date, has not obtained tie consensus of tie theological
community.
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those propositions which are to be held definitively is opposed to
21
the doctrine, of the Catholic Church.
Thus the document places each and every point of teaching that
has been declared "definitive" by the papal magisterium into the body
of "the doctrine of the Catholic Church," even when such a declaration does not fulfill the stringent criteria of a papal definition-criteria that Vatican Council I articulated with meticulous care after much
search and fierce debate.
The Roman Pontiff, when he speaks ex cathedra, that is, when, acting in the office of shepherd and teacher of all Christians, he defines, by virtue of his supreme apostolic authority, a doctrine
concerning faith and morals to be held by the universal church,
possesses through the divine assistance promised to him in the person of blessed Peter, the infallibility with which the divine Re22
deemer willed his church to be endowed.
Vatican Council II confirmed this definition and articulated its
limit with some precision: "This infallibility... extends just as far as
the deposit of divine revelation that is to be guarded as sacred and
23
faithfully expounded."
In protecting the stability of doctrine, the Apostolic Letter went
beyond the "deposit of revelation" when it declared that "each and
everything [doctrine] which is required to safeguard reverently and
expound faithfully the same deposit of faith" can be the object of a
definitive statement and thus must be embraced and held as irreformable. Several commentators noted that, with the help of the theory of
"definitive teaching," papal infallibility has been expanded beyond the
Constitutions of Vatican I and II and beyond the limits "canonized" by
the Council and by the Code of Canon Law.
To enforce the observance of this new provision, the motu proprio
added a clause to Canon 1371, note 1, that institutes 'Just penalty" for
anyone who fails to embrace and hold all and each that are definitively proposed and "obstinately rejects the doctrine mentioned in Canon 750, paragraph 2, and who does not retract after having been
admonished." Such persons, although not heretics, are "opposed to
the doctrine of the Catholic Church."

21
22

1983

CODE

c.750.

VATICAN COUNCIL I, FIRST DOGMATIC CONSTITUTION ON THE CHURCH OF CIIRSTi

Pastoraeternus ch. 4 (Ian Brayley trans., 1990).
23 Lumen gentium, supra note 7, at No. 25.
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C. An Assesmnent
What is the result of this new legislation? It has created a new
balance between stability and development. In the practical order, it
has increased-as no law has ever done it before-the "necessary
things," the doctrines that must be held, and it has decreased the
"doubtful things," teachings that were disputed questions. It has done
so not merely by normative directions but also by punitive sanctions.

This was a break with the explicit policy of Vatican Council II, which
wanted to proclaim the good news but refused to bolster its teaching
with the threat of criminal actions.2 4 Also to be noted is that the sanction in a given case can be heavy, since the delict is being "opposed to
the doctrine of the Catholic Church," which is, presumably, just one
notch under the crime of heresy.
The scope of Canon 218's affirming freedom in research is now
more narrowly drawn. Canon 749, paragraph 3, stating that nothing
should be held infallible unless it is manifestly so proven," has become moot because some doctrines must be held irreformable even if
they are not infallible, and persons in no way contesting infallible doctrine may be punished for being "opposed to the doctrine of the Cath26
olic Church."
All this is canon law now. The universal Church has the task of
receiving it, not in the sense of legal ratification but in the sense of
understanding it and assimilating its content. Such a reception is
bound to be a complex and long drawn-out process.
To reject the legislation would not be a Catholic response. Since
it comes from an authoritative source, it must be received ith obsequium, respect, in the canonical language.2 7 Canon 752 is applicable:
24 It is interesting that the opening paragraph of the Apostolic Letter strikes a
note of distrust: "To protect the Catholic faith against errors arising on the part of

some of the Christian faithful, in particularamong those who studiously dedicate theirselts
to the discipline of sacred theology, it appeared highly necessary... to add new norms."
Pope John Paul II, supra note 16, at 113 (emphasis added). I do not know of any
precedent in the acts of the Holy See for such a sweeping indictment of the Catholic
theologians.
25 1983 CODE c.749.

26 Looking into the future, one can anticipate that much ink will flow (or many
printouts will be produced) dealing with the question of how a proposition that is not
guaranteed to be infallible can remain forever irreformable.
27 The Latin term obsequiun, as it is used in canon law, has no precise equivalent

in English. "Loyalty" would be the closest to it. It has an affinity with the Italian
ossequio, which encompasses a whole gamut of meanings from greeting a friend with
respect to paying obedience to God. In canon law its exact meaning can be conjectured from the context only. The official translation by the Canon Law Society of
America renders obsequium with "submission," which is an interpretation, and not al-
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Although not assent of faith, religious obsequium [respect, loyalty] of
the intellect and the will must be given to a doctrine which the Supreme Pontiff or the college of bishops declares concerning the
28
faith and morals when they exercise the authentic magisterium.
Obsequiun, however, cannot determine the doctrinal weight of a
document. That is a matter for critical theological judgment. Nor
can reverence assess the degree of prudence that prompted the new
legislation, for such a judgment can be articulated only from an historical distance.
While this process of reception is getting under way, some comments are possible and in order.
The initial question for any commentator needs to be about the
weight of authority behind the Apostolic Letter. By way of exclusion,
the Letter does not carry the authenticating marks of infallibility as
they were determined by Vatican Council I and confirmed by Vatican
2
Council II, because it is not a solemn ex cathedrapronouncement. It
is a papal document of high authority, but not of the highest.
Through this motu proprio, the theory of "definitive teaching" has entered the realm of theology, although not with the same force as the
definition of infallibility did at Vatican Council I. No theologian can

ways the correct one. If the drafters of the Code of Canon Law had meant "submission," they had at their disposal precise Latin words such as submisio or oboedientia,
28

1983 CODE c. 752.

29 The Pope uses his full apostolic authority when he defines, ex cathedra, an article of faith; it is a rare event, having happened only twice in recent history: in 1854
Pius IX defined the dogma of the Immaculate Conception, and in 1950 Pius XII proclaimed the dogma of the Assumption. The Pope uses his apostolic authority, but not
to its fullness, in all of his other pronouncements, such as in Apostolic Constitutions,
motu proprio, encyclicals, and so forth. To determine the exact weight of such teachings is always a complex task; much depends on the Pope's intention (often to be
reconstructed), on the internal content of the document, and on the document's
historical circumstances. There cannot be any doubt that Vatican Council II more
than once corrected the non-infallible teachings of recent popes. For example, it lid
so in matters of religious freedom, salvation outside the Church, the historicity of the
Scriptures, and so forth. One can ask (but no one can answer) as to what position a
future ecumenical council would take concerning the theory of "definitive teaching."
Be that as it may, Vatican Council II left no doubt that the magisterium of an ecumenical council can abandon, supercede, or modify earlier papal teachings which were
not ex cathedradefinitions. Since this happened, theologians and canon lawyers must
face a delicate question: In assessing the authority, and interpreting the content, of
the contemporary documents of the Holy See, how far should one take into account
the fact that Vatican Council II, presided over by the then reigning popes, John XIII
and Paul VI, overruled earlier papal pronouncements of high but not of the highest
authority?
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ignore or bypass it. Indeed, to understand its full meaning, studies
are already well under way and progressing.3 0
As regards the content of the document and the substance of the
issue, it is probably wise, at this point in time, for a commentator not
to go beyond some tentative assessment relying on Newman's criteria
for authentic development. I think that we are already in a position to
raise some good questions and see where they lead us, but not in a
situation to articulate well-grounded conclusions.
(1) Does the new legislation confirm the oldfoundations and promfote the
vital operations of the institution? The document certainly intends to
protect the stability of the doctrinal foundations, but it seems to extend them beyond the traditional limits. It attributes unchangeable
permanency to doctrines to which the universal Church has not com-

mitted itself infallibly. In consequence, the vital operation of "faith
seeking understanding" appears restricted. The new laws impose a
hitherto unknown uniformity in doctrinal matters and safeguard it by
punitive measures.
(2) Is the new legislation organicallyrooted in the old? At the very core

of the new legislation is the idea of non-infallible but unchangeable
teaching. It is difficult to locate the origins of the idea in the Tradition; it has appeared in the last decades only. Neither Vatican I nor
Vatican II discussed definitive but non-infallible teaching to any
length or in any depth. Nor has there been-as far as we knowprevious to the promulgation of the rnotuproprioany sustained consultation on this issue among the bishops.
(3)Does the new legislationbring a new vigor of ife to the Church? The

new legislation is not likely to bring new vigor into theological research. The danger is that "definitive" proclamations will hamper the
natural and organic evolution of the "intelligence of faith;" the com30 See Symposium, Disciplinarela verila?, 21 CwSTL ESiMO NEL, SroRLA 1 (2000)
(being a special issue of the journal entirely dedicated to the issues raised by Ad
tuendamfidem). This text contains the papers of an international group of theologians
gathered for a symposium at the Institute of Religious Studies in Bologna, Italy. The
title of the collection points to the crux of the problem of the new legislation: Disdplinarela verita? That is, "To discipline the truth?"
A further remark (not from Bologna) on the issue of "disciplining the truth":
today, it is commonly admitted that the radical misjudgment of tie Inquisition v,as
that the truth can be imposed by force. Question: Is it prudent to impose "definitive"
doctrines with the threat of canonical penalties that in a given case can amount to the
loss of authority, office, function, right, privilege, faculty, title, or insignia, even
merely honorary, and so forth (cf. 1983 CODE c.1336, § 1), all at tie discretion of a
competent ecclesiastical superior? Does the Church really need such sanctions to
uphold its teaching? Does such legislation create a better environment for receiving
God's gifts-which is the main purpose of canon law?
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munity endowed by Christ with a supernatural instinct of faith cannot
play its part in the discovery of truth. Perhaps even more importantly
(tragically?), the expanding of the "irreformable" doctrines is bound
to slow down the ecumenical movement, a movement that we believe
is wanted by God and sustained by his Spirit. Sooner or later the Cath-

olic Church must state with no ambiguity whether or not the acceptance of "definitive teachings" will be considered an absolute condition
for its reunion with other Christian churches. If we are part of the

ecumenical movement, we must spell out our intentions.
Assessments of greater weight and of more lasting value will come
over a longer period of time and from better sources than this Essay.
They will come from the living Church, from all and each part of it:
the faithful, the episcopate, the theologians. They, God's people,
"cannot be mistaken in belief"-as Vatican Council II stated.
Throughout this process of "faith seeking understanding," the magisterium must be present in several ways: first by listening to the people
and encouraging their efforts, and then as the legitimate authority to
pronounce decisive judgments.
CONCLUSION

One must not be a Hegelian to assert that, in the history of the
human family, progress often comes through dialectical movements.
A dominant trend is followed by its opposite, and out of their encounter, a new synthesis emerges. Such a pattern may have something to
do with our human nature-we cannot comprehend the fullness of
reality all at once, because we approach our complex challenges onesidedly. Then, we realize that the truth is richer than our understanding of it, and we look at the other side and discover a synthesis.
This pattern of history, or this habit of the human mind, operates
in the life of the Church as well. There, too, we find a succession of
dialectical forces. To find it, it is enough to reflect on the events of
the last century. The beginnings of it were marked by strong trends in
support of the stability of doctrine and institutions: the "combat"
against modernism and the promulgation of the first Code of Canon
Law in 1917 are good examples of it. At the end of the pontificate of
Pius XII, the Church lived and operated under a strong central administration. The Pope was the supreme teacher and, by and large
the world over, the people lived under a strict discipline, imposed and
upheld by clear laws and sanctions (not to mention the far-reaching
eternal punishments detailed by many moral theologians and tacitiy
supported by the hierarchy). Many times we heard that no ecumeni-
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cal council will ever be needed again: the papacy can take care of the
Church. Obedience was the principal virtue.
Then came John XXIII, who in 1959, on the feast of the conversion of Saul the Persecutor who became Paul the Apostle, announced
his intention to convoke an ecumenical council. With a few quiet
words he reversed the forces of history. Returning to the ancient custom of the Church, he wanted to listen to the bishops and invited
them to speak freely-to him and to each other. He risked a new
balance between stability and development, and he succeeded. It is
not surprising that Cardinal John Henry Neuman's ideas dominated
many of the debates.
Through an awareness of the dialectics of history, we can come to
a better understanding of the Church's history. Today, stability seems
to be favored over creativity. But "in the universal body of the faithful," that is, "in the whole people ...from the bishops to the last of
the faithful laity,"3 ' there is an immense source of energy. Sooner or
later, its forces are bound to break to the surface and surprise the
observers. This seems to be the pattern of history-or, is this the pattern that God uses to lead his people?
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Lumen gentium, supra note 7, at No. 12.
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